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It is not true that literal translators translate only literally and free translators only 
freely. Both types of translators employ the same transformations (‘shifts’) more 
or less, but for different reasons. The difference lies in their tolerance of source 
language interference. Literal translators resort to transformations when a literal 
rendering would result in an ungrammatical or misleading translation, whereas free 
translators employ transformations to produce a text that sounds natural in the target 
language. When the study of a translation confronts us with a rendering that seems 
to deviate from the source text, i.e. smells of interpretation / ideology, we should 
first ascertain that the transformation in case does not spring from grammatical, 
stylistic, logical etc. reasons. A try-out of the literal alternative(s) the translator has 
rejected is often enlightening: it often shows why he preferred a transformation. 
This provides us with a filter to avoid rash conclusions, which is welcome in the 
study of both modern and ancient translations. 
Introduction
The role of interpretation in early translations is a major point of discussion in the 
two disciplines of my interest: Translation Studies and Septuagint Studies. In July 
2004 I attended the Leuven Colloquium on ‘The Septuagint and Messianism’. The 
central question was to what extent messianic tendencies can be detected in the 
Septuagint. In other words: to what extent can we see the Septuagint as a document 
of its contemporary history? This presupposes the methodological question: how 
can we distinguish interpretative and linguistic factors? I was surprised that of the 
lectures I attended only Prof. Aejmelaeus’ paper was explicitly methodological. 
Other speakers gave interesting lectures but did not address methodological issues 
(Knibb 2006). The lack of methodological clarity made it difficult to communicate. 
I saw that even scholars who were working on the same Biblical book talked at 
cross-purposes. There were two specialists on the book of Psalms who represent 
opposite viewpoints. Dr. Schaper (Tübingen) holds that those renderings that 
1 This article has been published earlier in Voitila, A. & J. Jokiranta (eds.) 2008. Scripture in 
Transition: Essays on Septuagint, Hebrew Bible, and Dead Sea Scrolls in Honour of Raija Sollamo. 
Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism 126. Leiden: Brill. 107–125.
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appear to be ‘deviations’ from the Hebrew source text should first and foremost be 
considered as witnesses to the translator’s ideology or as references to historical 
situations. Prof. Pietersma (Toronto), on the other hand, explains ‘deviations’ in 
terms of his ‘Interlinear Model’. In his view the translator operated primarily on 
the micro-level so that most shifts have to be explained linguistically. If carried to 
extremes, the former position can lead to unbridled fancy, whereas the latter can 
lead to historical blindness. I think it is a challenge to do justice to the underlying 
intention of both positions (Van der Kooij 2000, 379).
In Translation Studies such controversies are also well-known. Translators 
frequently accuse each other of falsifying the style or intention of an author and 
often do so in the public press. This has been the case since Jerome and his 
rival Rufinus. Sometimes such discussions take on a scholarly garb. Twenty years 
ago Kitty van Leuven-Zwart published a dissertation in which she developed an 
intricate model for the comparison of source text and target text. She applied it 
to a Dutch translation of Don Quixote and argued that the numerous shifts on the 
micro-level had led to a totally false picture of the hero on the macro-level (Van 
Leuven-Zwart 1984). Nine years later a colleague of the Quixote-translator, Peter 
Verstegen, produced a seething reply in his dissertation. He demonstrated that 
the majority of the mentioned shifts had arisen from linguistic needs and that Van 
Leuven’s picture of Don Quixote as alternately sane and insane was beside the 
mark. In one breath the author, a prize-winning translator, denounced the discipline 
of Translation Studies as a waste of time (Verstegen 1993). In other countries there 
are similar debates (Hermans 1999, 1–6).
The approaches of early, linguistic Translation Studies can still be of good 
use for the study of transformations. Without careful study of the micro-level it 
is impossible to arrive at reliable conclusions about the translator’s method (Van 
der Louw 2006). The first reason is purely quantitative: while the most important 
decisions are made on the macro-level according to modern theorists, the micro-
level is where the greatest number of decisions is made. Second, study of the 
micro-level may be quite appropriate for ancient translations, since their translators 
neither always followed a macro-level approach nor necessarily departed from a 
postulate of stylistic ‘equivalence’. And if they did, who says that all micro-level 
decisions logically follow from the overall approach? Third, the normative approach 
in the often popular textbooks of translating hangs closely together with the practice 
of translating and is of obvious value to research on how translators work. Fourth, a 
bottom-up approach can serve as a methodological filter for assumptions that are 
made on the macro-level. 
The purpose of my paper is to show that identifying transformations and 
labelling them forces us to ask further questions which will improve our methods. 
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From ancient translations I will then illustrate how the problem-oriented study of 
transformations works out on different levels of language.
Why Are Transformations Applied?
Transformations or shifts are micro-level changes that occur in the transfer 
from one language to another. They were often central to early textbooks of 
translating, which listed them, with many examples from published translations.2 
Transformations were categorized accord ing to the semantic relationship they 
express: generalization (‘spear’ → ‘weapon’), specification (‘weapon’ → ‘spear’), 
omission, addition, explicitation, literal translation etc. But the classifications by the 
various scholars were not always consistent and differed considerably from one 
author to another. For the purpose of micro-level research I compiled a catalogue 
of transformations from different textbooks.3
Transformations are not necessarily applied consciously, as process-oriented 
research has shown. Translators do not think: ‘Antonymic and converse translation 
haven’t worked. Let me try a specification.’ Rather, a translator is faced with a 
problem, upon which solutions suggest themselves to his mind, the ones requiring 
least effort first (Chesterman 1997, 89–116; Zabalbeascoa 2000). Larose (1989, 
17) rightly says:4 
Or, les procédés dont parlent Vinay et Darbelnet ne sont pas des algorithmes 
de traduction, mais des étiquettes apposées à des résultats.
Now the identification of transformations – I prefer this term over the somewhat 
more burdened ‘shifts’ – is in itself not the essential part of the research. For 
Septuagint Studies it is a step forward, though, because of the terminological 
refinement. Until now, everything that seems to deviate from a literal translation 
has been termed ‘free rendering’ (Wilk 2003, passim). Lumping everything together 
leads to methodological confusion. It entails a wrong and uninformed picture of 
2 Munday 2001, Chapter 4; Stolze 1997, chs. 4–5.
3 See Van der Louw 2007, 57–90, and for a different classification Molina & Hurtado Albir 2002. I 
drew mainly from Vinay & Darbelnet 1997, Langeveld 1986, Newmark 1981 and 1988. 
4 See also Molina & Hurtado Albir 2002. Although they make the point that transformation labels 
describe the result, not the strategies by which a translator solves problems, they confusingly speak 
of ‘translation techniques’.
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the translator.5 The advantage of labelling is that it raises the real question: why 
do translators apply transformations (Toury 1995, 85)? The answer is obvious: 
because a literal translation does not work!6 Literal translation is always the easiest 
and fastest method.7 Even the so-called ‘free translator’ proceeds literally most 
of the time, at least in prose. A transformation is used to solve the translational 
problem that arises from a literal rendering. This has an important methodological 
implication. Behind each transformation stands a literal rendering that has been 
rejected. 
Thus when we encounter a ‘free rendering’ we should not only categorize it as 
a transformation, but also investigate its rationale by studying the literal translation 
that was not chosen. In many cases the translational problem then surfaces quickly. 
The rejected literal rendering – often there is more than one possibility – should 
be scrutinized first from a linguistic angle, then from the viewpoint of style, logic, 
communicative purpose, culture and world view / ideology (or theology).8 This order 
should be kept, for where it is simply the case that the norms of the target language 
have been obeyed we cannot accuse a translator of adding his own interpretation. 
I have been a translator for ten years and I do not like my colleagues, even the 
deceased, to be accused unjustly.
There is one question which merits a separate treatment, but which I cannot leave 
unmentioned: if the translator rejects a literal rendering and solves his translational 
problem, how does he do this? Does he simply take the ‘next-literal’ rendering 
or does he avail himself of the opportunity for further-reaching operations? If we 
suspect the latter, we should look at the rejected next-literal rendering too.
5 A typical reaction I get is: ‘Why do you want to explain “free renderings”? Of course a free translator 
employs free renderings. What else would you expect?’ But on further discussion my interlocutors 
realize they still have to explain something. We may take for granted that free translators employ 
free renderings, but then in many cases the free translator employs literal renderings. Why does he 
do that? ‘Well, apparently he didn’t see the need for a free translation here.’ With this admission we 
introduce the notion of necessity. Of course the translator did not indulge in unlimited freedom, for 
then he would never finish his work. Translating is like other crafts in balancing purpose and means 
in every case.
6 Cf. Weaver 1989, a description of his ponderings while translating a paragraph by Carlo Emilio 
Gadda.
7 I do not speak of large-scale translational abridgement. This becomes clear when we imagine 
two equally experienced translators translating the same text, one operating literally and the other 
with the objective of ‘stylistic equivalence’. The latter adds stylistic constraints to the demand of 
‘equivalence of content’, which increases the difficulty. This was proved by process-oriented research. 
Experiments showed that experienced translators, sense-oriented as they are, pay attention to style, 
keep the needs of the target audience in mind and exhibit macro-structural text awareness, whereas 
beginning translator are, as a rule, sign-oriented and stick to words. Hence, experienced translators 
identify more translational problems and spend more time solving them. As a consequence, they do 
not always word quicker than beginning translators. Cf. Bell 1998; Jääskeläinen & Tirkkonen-Condit 
1991; Jonasson 1998.
8 Aejmelaeus 2006: “Man darf sich nicht vom ersten Eindruck der theologischen Exegese täuschen 
lassen.”
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When we have found out, for all transformations in a considerable body of 
text, on what levels the translator identified his translational problems, we get 
an impression of the translational norms that guided him (Toury 1995, 56ff., 93ff; 
Schäffner 1999). The relationship between the motives behind the transformations 
will also reveal something about the hierarchy of these norms in the mind of the 
translator. I do not mean to suggest that this hierarchy is always conscious. A 
beginning translator, for example, may start with unconscious assumptions about 
‘translating faithfully’ and a hidden hierarchy will stamp his work.
Let us put these considerations into practice, starting with an example by a 
prolific author from the field of Translation Studies, the late André Lefevere (1992, 
40). He writes: 
[T]he Aramaic Jesus Christ is supposed to have spoken did not have a copula. He can 
therefore never have said: ‘This is my body’ when pointing at a loaf of bread. The copula 
was put in by translators for ideological rather than linguistic reasons. 
Now the Greek text of Mark 14:22 reads tou/to evstin to. sw/ma, mou ‘this is my 
body.’ Since no Aramaic parent text of the gospels is known, we could reconstruct 
it as ypiWG !DE or ymiv.GI !DE.9 A more literal translation, without the objected copula, would 
run Átou/to to. sw/ma, mou. But this means ‘this body of mine’ and is not a sentence 
at all! The Greek copula is obligatory here. In other words, it was put in for purely 
linguistic reasons. The theological dispute about the copula ‘est’ and the nature of 
Christ’s presence in the Eucharist raged in the Middle Ages, more than a thousand 
years later. Thus Lefevere’s remark falls flat on its face from both viewpoints. 
We will now review some different categories of rejected literal renderings.
A Literal Translation Is Not Possible
In many cases a literal translation is not possible, as will be illustrated by the 
following examples. The first is taken from a bilingual Graeco-Aramaic inscription:10
h[tij to. ka,lloj avmei,mhton ei=ce
she possessed a matchless beauty
hwhy rypXw bj
twbj !m hwhy [md al Xnya rb yz $yh
she was so excellent and beautiful that no-
body could compare with her in excellence
9 The former is proposed by Jeremias 1967, 191–194, the latter by Casey 1998, 219f., 239. I thank 
Dr. H. Sysling for the references and Prof. T. Muraoka for his comments.
10 H. Donner / W. Röllig 2002. Kanaanäische und aramäische Inschriften (5. Auflage). Wiesbaden: 
Harassowitz (= KAI), nr. 276. It is not certain whether the Greek is indeed the source text, but in either 
case the transformation can be adduced under this heading.
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Compounds of the type avmei,mhtoj ‘matchless’ cannot be imitated in Semitic 
languages. Its semantic components have to be distributed over several words. 
Our next example is of a syntactic nature:
 
Ti, to. o'n avei,( ge,nesin de. ouvk 
e;con... 
Quid est quod semper sit neque ullum habeat 
ortum… ?10
What is that, which has always existed, but does not have an origin?
This change of accidence from participle to finite verb is obligatory, i.e. demanded 
by the grammar of the target language: classical Latin lacks a participle of esse. 
Regarding the Septuagint rendering of Proverbs 6:23 the charge of ideology 
has been brought forward: 
rAa hr"Atw> hw"c.mi rnE yKi 
rs"Wm tAxk.AT ~yYIx;÷ %r,d,w> 
o[ti lu,cnoj evntolh. no,mou kai. fw/j 
kai. o`do.j zwh/j e;legcoj kai. paidei,a
for a lamp is the commandment and 
the law is a light
and a path of life are reproofs of 
discipline
for a lamp [is] the commandment of the 
law, and a light
and a path of life [is] reproof and 
instruction
Cook (1999, 454) claims the translator deliberately combined the words 
differently to create a clearer reference to the Mosaic Law.11 In my opinion it is 
more probable that he avoided a literal translation, since this would result in an 
inadmissible sentence: 
 Áo[ti lu,cnoj evntolh. kai. no,moj fw/j 
 lit. ‘for lamp commandment and law light’.
Not only does this contain an awkward double verbless clause, but the chiasmus 
makes it also difficult, at least for the hearer, to ascertain whether no,moj ‘law’ still 
belongs to the predicate or already introduces a new subject. The translator solved 
this problem by the simple transposition of the conjunction kai, ‘and’ (change of 
syntactic function). In the second stich he did the same, probably to make both 
lines syntactically parallel, as they are in the original.12 An alternative solution 
would have been the addition of the copula evsti,n, but apparently the translator 
appreciated the proverbial stamp of a Greek verbless clause.
11 The surprising Greek text does not point to a different source text, rwaw hrwt twcm rn ykÁ ‘for a 
lamp is the commandment of the torah and a light,’ nor should we assume this to be the reading in 
the mind of the translator.
12 The Revised English Bible does the same thing: ‘reproof and correction point the way to life.’
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I do not think the tenor of the verse is materially altered by this transformation. 
The reshuffling of the first stich strengthens the association with Psalm 118 (MT 
119):105 ‘Your word is a lamp to my feet and a light to my path’, but it does not make 
the Law of Moses explicit, which could have been done easily. The international 
character of the Hebrew Proverbs has thus been preserved.
A Literal Translation Is Possible but Not Natural
Our next category originates where a literal translation would be possible, but not 
natural. Many implicitations and explicitations of participants have their roots in 
this consideration as do transpositions and omissions. For example, in Isaiah 1:2 a 
change of word order is found at the end of the verse, where the personal pronoun 
has changed place:
yb w[Xp hmhw auvtoi. de, me hvqe,thsan
but they rebelled against me but they denied me
The Isaiah translator puts the object pronoun before the verb to arrive at a 
natural word order, avoiding an enclitic in a final position (Sollamo 2006). Adhering 
to the Hebrew word order sounds unnatural. Very literal translators, to whom 
adherence to the word order of the original is important, tolerate such interference. 
In Proverbs 6:1 the transformation seems to have contextual implications:
^[<rel. T'b.r;['-~ai ynIB. Ui`e,( eva.n evgguh,sh| so.n fi,lon 
My son, if you stand surety for your 
neighbour…
Son, if you stand surety for a friend of 
yours… 
The translator omits the possessive element (‘my’). Does he want to obscure 
the fatherhood of the speaker? I do not think so. A literal translation, Áui`e, mou, is 
possible, but in the Septuagint it is rare.13 This is not the natural way to say it in 
Greek. Already in the more literal LXX-Pentateuch ynIB. ‘my son’ is therefore often 
rendered with vocatives te,knon ‘child’ or ui`e, ‘son’. These renderings display a non-
obligatory omission of the possessive suffix (pronoun). 
The following example contains a typical Latin idiom, which is difficult to transfer 
literally into most European languages (Reichmann 1943, 80):
13 E.g. 2 Samuel 13:25 mh. dh,( ui`e, mou( mh. poreuqw/men pa,ntej h`mei/j ‘no, my son, let not all of us go’.
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 post captam urbem meta. th.n u`po. Ga,lloij genome,nhn a[lwsin
 after the taken city after its capture by the Gauls
A literal translation would be understandable but unidiomatic Greek. This 
accounts for the change of word class from participle to noun. The explicitation of 
‘the Gauls’, on the other hand, has no grammatical motivation. A literal translation 
would have been good Greek. Rather, information has been made explicit for the 
benefit of Greek readers who are less familiar with Roman history than Romans 
are (communicative purpose). 
Of course, greetings belong to the realm of idiom. This is an example of different 
closing benedictions in a bilingual inscription (idiom):
 ‘may He bless / may be blessed’  $rby  ivn tu,cai avgaqa/i [sic] ‘for good luck’14
Style
The next category falls outside the sphere of the literal translator, generally 
speaking, for it concerns the choice not between good and bad, but between good 
and better: 
15
fai,netai, moi kh/noj i;soj qe,oisin.
That man seems to me equal to gods.
Ille mi par esse deo videtur.15 
That man seems to me equal to (a) god.
The plural ‘gods’ in Sappho’s poem has been rendered by Catullus as singular 
‘god’. Is he perhaps smuggling in monotheism or is style his concern? The former 
possibility is a priori unlikely for all we know about Catullus. Let us therefore try out 
a literal translation. It would run *Ille mi par esse diis videtur (or deis). Metrically 
this would be all right, but it would sound worse with its nasty series of i - and 
e-sounds. With the singular deo Catullus avoids this while at the same time imitating 
Sappho’s i-o alternation. Since deus can mean ‘the god’ but also ‘a god’ there is not 
necessarily a difference in meaning.
A similar example can be gleaned from LXX-Proverbs 6:13.
wl'g>rB. llemo wn"y[eB. #reqo
`wyt'([oB.c.a,B. hr,mo÷
~O dV auvto.j evnneu,ei ovfqalmw/|( shmai,nei de. 
podi,( dida,skei de. evnneu,masin daktu,lwn
14 Closing blessing of an inscription, KAI nr. 39 (389 BCE).
15 From Seele 1995, 46. I thank Dr. R. ten Kate (Groningen) for his help.
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He winks with his eye, speaks with 
his foot, / gives signs with his fingers.
The same [man] winks with an eye, gives signs 
with a foot, / teaches with the signs of fingers.
In the Hebrew text the mischief-maker teaches ‘with his fingers’ (wyt'[oB.c.a,B.), in 
the translation ‘with the signs of fingers’ (evnneu,masin daktu,lwn). This looks like 
an addition for clarity, but neither grammatically nor semantically can I find any 
reason for it. It is again rewarding to imagine how the alternative without addition 
would have read, for this makes the rationale clear at once Á))) de. podi,( dida,skei de. 
daktu,loij) It is a coincidence that a literal rendering results in such a remarkable 
alliteration, but in this instance one feels overwhelmed. The ancient teachers of 
rhetoric knew that there is only a dim line between alliteration and cacophony.16 
Here the alliteration becomes tongue-breaking and suggests stammering. The 
addition of evnneu,masin tones it down and makes it an acceptable and still notable 
piece of alliteration. 
Logic And Coherence
Logic and coherence are important considerations in rejecting a literal rendering 
that is in itself grammatically and stylistically appropriate. Such is the case in 
Isaiah 1:10:
~dos. ynEyciq. hw"hy>-rb;d> W[m.vi
hr'(mo[] ~[; Wnyhel{a/ tr;AT WnyzIa]h; 
VAkou,sate lo,gon kuri,ou( a;rcontej Sodomwn\
prose,cete no,mon qeou/( lao.j Gomorraj) 
Hear the word of the Lord, 
rulers of Sodom,
listen to the teaching of our God, 
people of Gomorra!
Hear the word of the Lord,  
rulers of Sodoma,
be attentive of the law of God, 
people of Gomorra!
The possessive suffix in Wnyhel{a/ ‘our God’ is omitted in Greek. This smells of 
ideology. A recent study claims: “durch die Auslassung des (...) Possessivsuffixes 
bei ~yhil{a/ erinnert die Wendung an no,moj qeou/ (...); sie bezieht sich demnach auf 
das schriftlich fixierte ‚Gesetz Gottes’. Zugleich unterstreicht die Auslassung die 
Allgemeingültigkeit dieses Gesetzes” (Wilk 2003, 21). This is not correct, to my 
mind. For a clearer picture we need to identify the translational problem first. 
Comparing modern Bible translations is often helpful for that purpose. 
(10) Ihr Machthaber von Sodom, hört, was der HERR sagt! Du Volk von 
Gomorra, vernimm die Weisung unseres Gottes! 
16 Lausberg 1973, § 968–969, 975–976; cf. Demetrius, De elocutione (ed. Rhys Roberts) § 255, 
who connects it to the ‘forcible style’.
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(11) »Was soll ich mit euren vielen Opfern?« fragt der HERR. (Gute Nachricht)
As the quotation marks indicate, vs 10 introduces the direct speech of vs 11. 
The Hebrew word torah denotes the immediately following divine speech, and 
is translated as ‘Weisung’. This rendering stays close to the primary meaning of 
torah ‘teaching, direction’. Nevertheless, the tradition from the LXX-Pentateuch of 
translating torah with no,moj ‘law’ was so deeply rooted (Segal 1987) that the Isaiah 
translator followed it. As a consequence no,moj ‘law’ can no longer be viewed as an 
introduction by the prophet of God’s direct speech of vs 11. Rather, vs 10 turns into 
a general appeal, and there is no longer any reason to assume a change of speaker 
between vss 10 and 11. The impression is, then, that God speaks in 1:10–11. And 
in that case it is clear why ‘be attentive of the law of our God’ cannot come from 
God’s mouth, and, hence, why the pronoun must be omitted. As this transformation 
can be explained text-immanently, theological explanations are out of order. The 
reception of the translated text may have stressed that God is universal, but such 
was not the translator’s intention.
Under the heading of logic and coherence I would like to subsume those 
transformations that are not necessary in themselves, but that flow from earlier 
decisions of the translator (Levý 1967; Wilss 1997). Every decision narrows down 
the options further on. In contrast with modern translations this holds also true for 
mistakes or renderings the translator would have avoided in a later stage of his 
developed competence. It seems that the Septuagint translators often did not go 
back to correct earlier renderings, but grappled with the consequences later in 
the text. A reason for this puzzling behaviour might be that they did not have word 
processors but wrote on very costly materials on which corrections were often 
visible. 
A striking instance is Proverbs 6:1, where the Hebrew text reads as follows:
^[<rel. T'b.r;['-~ai ynIB.
^yP,K; rZ"l; T'[.q:T'
My son, if you stand surety for 
someone else,
[if you] have struck your hands 
with a stranger...
The ‘basic meaning’ of [:re is ‘friend’, but it is most often used in the generic 
sense of ‘neighbour, someone else’, as it is the case here.17 Likewise rz" means 
‘stranger’, but it appears often in the weakened sense of ‘someone else’ too. 
From other places we know that these generic meanings were known to the LXX 
translators. Now the Proverbs translator renders [:re with the specific ‘friend’ and 
17 Cf. the Revised English Bible ‘if you give yourself in pledge to another person.’ So already 
Symmachus and Theodotion: plhsi,on)
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lets his decision stand, which forces him to make several transformations. A literal 
translation based on this choice would have read:
ÁUi`e,( eva.n evgguh,sh| so.n fi,lon( 
paradw,sh|j sh.n cei/ra avllotri,w|...
*Son, if you stand surety for your friend, 
[if] you deliver your hand to a foreigner...
Adherence to standard renderings in this synonymous distich has the result that 
the same person is first called a friend and then a stranger. The word rz" ‘stranger’ 
cannot be translated literally any more, since the person in question has already 
been called a friend, and a friend cannot be a stranger. It is therefore strength-
ened to ‘enemy’ (specification). At the same time this transformation enabled the 
translator, with his Greek aversion to repetition, to turn a synonymous distich into 
a contrastive one: 
Ui`e,( eva.n evgguh,sh| so.n fi,lon( 
paradw,sh|j sh.n cei/ra evcqrw/|/|...
Son, if you stand surety for your friend,  
[if] you deliver your hand to an enemy...
In 6:2–3 the translator is forced into further transformations because of the 
same decision.
Communicative Purpose
The communicative purpose (or ‘pragmatic function’) of the text is an important 
factor behind translators’ decisions. Style makes a text attractive, which is essential 
for communication. But there is more. The text has to convey a message, which 
should not be hampered by information gaps, incomprehensible metaphors, 
misunderstandings, unintended humour etc. For this purpose implicit information is 
made explicit, the sense of a metaphor is rendered instead of the image, ambiguities 
are resolved, comical effects or wrong implications are suppressed.
Genesis 2:9 confronts us with an unexpected addition. The Hebrew text speaks 
of ‘the tree of the knowing of good and evil’, but the Septuagint goes beyond this 
by speaking of to. xu,lon tou/ eivde,nai gnwsto.n kalou/ kai. ponhrou/ ‘the tree of the 
knowing of what is knowable of good and evil’. Scholars usually consider it an 
exegetical rendering that deliberately limits the width of the original: the eating 
of this fruit does not give absolute knowledge, because man will be limited in his 
knowledge: ‘there are dimensions of good and evil that cannot be known.’ This 
conclusion is a bit rash. Let us first explore the phraseology of ‘knowing good and 
evil’ more fully. The phrase occurs four times.
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2:9  to. xu,lon tou/ eivde,nai gnwsto.n kalou/ kai. ponhrou/ 
2:17 avpo. de. tou/ xu,lou tou/ ginw,skein kalo.n kai. ponhro,n ... 
3:5   kai. e;sesqe w`j qeoi. ginw,skontej kalo.n kai. ponhro,n 
3:22  w`j ei-j evx h`mw/n tou/ ginw,skein kalo.n kai. ponhro,n
[English translation of LXX] 
2:9   the tree of the knowing of what is knowable of good and evil 
2:17  but from the tree of knowing good and evil... 
3:5   and you will be as gods, knowing good and evil 
3:22  [Adam has become] as one of us, to know good and evil
In 2:17; 3:5, 22 the Septuagint gives a literal rendering of the Hebrew. It would 
have been perfectly possible to translate *to. xu,lon tou/ ginw,skein kalo.n kai. 
ponhro,n ‘the tree of knowing good and evil’ in 2:9 as well. Yet something was 
added to the translation of 2:9. Note that only the first occurrence of this phrase 
received a special treatment. I would propose that the rendering in 2:9 is meant 
as an interpretative aid to the remaining occurrences. In my opinion the translator 
wanted to make sure that ‘knowing good and evil’ was not interpreted as having 
practical experience with, i.e. being infected by good and evil, for that would have 
grave theological consequences in 3:22, but only ‘knowing what is knowable of 
good and evil’. The same issue is addressed by Targum Onkelos with its rendering 
in 2:9 ‘and the tree the eaters of whose fruits will wisely discern between good and 
evil.’
The translators further deal with the different nuances of ‘heart’ in Hebrew and 
Greek.18 In Hebrew ble is the centre of the intellect, kardi,a is rather the seat of 
the passions, roughly speaking.19 The desired notion is expressed in Greek by 
e;ndeia frenw/n ‘lack of wits / brains (lit. midriff)’, which constitutes a modification. 
The considerations guiding the LXX-translator apparently appealed to Jerome. 
Normally he rendered his parent text quite literally, but in Proverbs 6:32 he followed 
the Septuagint:
 qui autem adulter est propter cordis inopiam perdet animam suam.
18 As in, e.g., Proverbs 6:21, 25 and Isaiah 1:16.
19 The use of kardi,a for ‘intellect’ was mainly restricted to Stoic philosophy, to which the translator 
apparently did not want to subscribe with a literal translation. The Stoic belief that the soul was governed 
by the heart had received hard blows since the discovery of the nerval system and its connections 
to the brain by the Alexandrian (!) scientists Erasistratus and Herophilus (c. 280 BC), but Chrysippus 
of Soloi (3rd century BC) continued to defend it. Cf. Tieleman 1996 (I thank Prof. Simo Knuuttila of 
Helsinki University for this reference). Neither did the translator subscribe to the opposite (Platonic) 
school by using evgkefalo,j ‘brain’, but he used the everyday term, unburdened with philosophy.
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Culture
A separate class of transformations points to cultural differences. These should be 
taken in the widest sense of the word, to include material culture, as in Proverbs 
6:21, where it says about injunctions of parents:
dymit' ^B.li-l[; ~rev.q'
`^t<roG>r>G:-l[; ~den>['÷ 
a;fayai de. auvtou.j evpi. sh/| yuch/| dia. panto.j 
kai. evgkloi,wsai evpi. sw/| trach,lw|
bind them upon your heart always,
put them around your neck.
but bind them upon your soul always
and put [them] as a chain around your neck.
Notable is the rendering of ble ‘heart’ with yuch, ‘soul’. It would be tempting to 
relate it to the Greek concept of the soul. But what bothered the translator here? 
He felt a problem with the metaphor. To understand this, we look at the very similar 
Proverbs 7:3: 
evpi,grayon de. evpi. to. pla,toj th/j kardi,aj sou  
write them [my words] on the tablet of your heart.
This metaphor is clear. Words can be written on a tablet, and writing on the tablet 
of your heart is a metaphor for memorizing. Now the metaphor of Proverbs 6:21a 
is clear only in the Israelite context. Seals were often worn on a cord around the 
neck, so that the seal was close to the heart (Genesis 38:18; Song of Songs 8:6). 
In the Hellenistic world seals were worn on rings, so that it is understandable that in 
Genesis 38:18 ~twOx ‘seal’ is rendered as daktu,lioj ‘ring’ and the ‘cord’ is turned into 
a ‘necklace’. This cultural difference made the metaphor in Proverbs 6:21a difficult 
to understand. The translator wanted to assist a metaphorical understanding and 
turned ble ‘heart’ into yuch, ‘soul’ (modification). 
An institutional difference can be traced in Proverbs 6:33, which describes what 
will happen to a man who commits adultery with a married woman:
ac"m.yI !Alq'w>-[g:n<
hx,M'ti al{ AtP'r>x,w>÷ 
VOdu,naj te kai. avtimi,aj u`pofe,rei( 
to. de. o;neidoj auvtou/ ouvk evxaleifqh,setai eivj to.n aivw/na)
He will ‘find’ plague and shame
and his shame shall not be wiped off.
He endures pains and dishonours 
and his disgrace will not be wiped off in eternity.
The specification of ac'm' ‘to find, experience’ into u`pofe,rw ‘to endure’ is obligatory, 
since eu`ri,skw ‘to find’ does not express the notion of experiencing evil. The chosen 
term also suggests longer duration, which fits well into the adaptation of this verse.
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The Hebrew [g:n< ‘stroke, plague’ is only here rendered as ovdu,naj ‘pains’, 
alliterating with o;neidoj ‘disgrace’. The Greek text stresses the subjective element, 
the pain felt by the adulterer as a consequence of his deeds. This transformation 
has no linguistic roots. With some minor adaptations a literal translation would be 
quite acceptable:
ÁPlhgh,n te kai. avtimi,an u`pofe,rei Æ to. de. o;neidoj auvtou/ ouvk evxaleifqh,setai) 
He endures a stroke and dishonour / and his disgrace will not be wiped off.
The relevant background here is cultural. In the Hebrew text the adulterer sets 
his very vp,n< ‘life’ at risk (32). He will literally suffer [g:n< ‘strokes’ (33) and become 
the target of the husband’s ~q'n" ‘revenge’ (34), which he cannot escape by paying 
rp,Ko ‘compensation’ (35). This presupposes a society where disputes were settled 
privately or in small courts such as elders in the city-gate. An adulterer and the 
woman concerned were liable to a death penalty.20 In the Septuagint, however, 
the adulterer risks his yuch, ‘soul’ (32). He will suffer ovdu,naj te kai. avtimi,aj ‘pain 
and dishonour’. The outraged husband will not take revenge, but bring him to trial, 
kri,sij (34). A ransom may settle the affair legally, but it will not extinguish the 
husband’s enmity. The Greek text presupposes a more centralized society with 
a professional law-court, in which an adulterer is punished but not killed.21 The 
translator has culturally adapted the text to a new situation. This also explains 
why ovdu,naj te kai. avtimi,aj22 ‘pains and dishonours’ are plural. Since LXX does not 
imply the execution of the adulterer, he will survive and feel pains and dishonours 
repeatedly. After all this it will be no surprise that the addition of eivj to.n aivw/na ‘in 
eternity’ stems from the translator. It is at odds with the Hebrew text, where the fate 
of the adulterer is sealed (with Baumgartner 1890, 73f. contra de Lagarde 1863, 
25).
Ideology
When we have checked the rejected literal translation to find out why it was rejected, 
and have thus hopefully filtered out everything that does not point to interpretative 
colouring by the translator, we are left with some pretty convincing instances of 
interpretation and modification of the source text, which unmistakably point to the 
20 Leviticus 20:10; Deuteronomy 22:22ff.; Ezekiel 23:45ff.
21 From Sirach 23:18–26, dealing with the consequences of adultery but silent about a death 
penalty, it is usually concluded that a death penalty for adultery had become theoretical in Hellenistic 
times (except for cases of Lynchjustiz). This accords with Athenian sources stating that an adulterer 
may not be killed, e.g. Demosthenes, Orationes 23 (In Aristocratem), 53; Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 57,3. Cf. 
Der neue Pauly: Enzyklopädie der Antike 3, 900. The laws of Alexandria were based on Athenian law, 
cf. Rupprecht 1994, 67.
22 The Hebrew !wlq is often rendered literally with avtimi,a ‘dishonour’ (singular). 
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world view, ideology or theology of the translator or of his audience (!). Our first 
example comes from Exodus 4:24, by no means the freest translation within the 
Septuagint.
 !AlM'B; %r<D<b; yhiy>w:
 hw"hy> WhveG>p.YIw:: 
Atymih] vQEb;y>w: 
VEge,neto de. evn th/| o`dw/| evn tw/| katalu,mati 
sunh,nthsen auvtw/| a;ggeloj kuri,ou 
kai. evzh,tei auvto.n avpoktei/nai)
And it came to pass on the way at 
a lodging place, that YHWH met 
him [Moses] and tried to kill him.
And it came to pass on the way at the 
lodging place, that an angel of the Lord 
met him [Moses] and tried to kill him.
This transformation is prompted, not by linguistic or stylistic constraints, but by the 
reluctance to depict the Lord as a man with a murderous intention: not the Lord, 
but merely his angel tried to kill Moses. Understandably, theologically motivated 
renderings are more frequent in ‘freely translated’ Septuagint books (Tov 1999).
Indeed, the first example in LXX-Isaiah is encountered soon (1:4),
laer'f.yI vAdq.-ta, Wca]nI parwrgi,sate to.n a[gion tou/ Israhl
they have rejected the Holy One of 
Israel
you have made angry the Holy One of 
Israel
For our purpose the change of 3rd into 2nd person plural, which harmonizes 
the participants, is a side issue. More germane is the added article before ‘Israel’. 
Sometimes the name Israhl functions as a genitive without the article, e.g. in 
1:24 oi` ivscu,ontej Israhl ‘the mighty ones of Israel’. Strictly speaking, the article 
is non-obligatory. But in 1:4 the article is necessary to avoid the misreading *to.n 
a[gion Israhl ‘the holy Israel’. At the same time, the article makes it impossible in 
a manuscript without interpunction to read ‘Israel’ as a vocative that introduces 1:5. 
The theological element in the translation is that God is not ‘rejected’, but ‘made 
angry’. For #a;n" modern lexica give as meaning: qal ‘to spurn’, pi. ‘to discard, reject’. 
Similar translations can be found throughout the LXX, but only in collocations 
where God is not the object.23 Wherever in Hebrew God is ‘rejected’, the verb is 
rendered with the verb paroxu,nw ‘to provoke, make angry’24 or with its synonym 
parorgi,zw. And where God’s words or laws are ‘rejected’, the LXX uses blasfhme,w 
23 It is rendered with avpwqe,w ‘to push away’ Jeremiah 23:17; avqete,w ‘to set at naught’ 1 Kingdoms 
(MT 1 Samuel) 2:17; mukthri,zw ‘to turn up the nose at’ etc.
24 Numbers 14:11, 23; 16:30; Deuteronomy 31:20; 32:19; (...) Isaiah 5:24; 60:14 etc.
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‘to blaspheme’ besides (Isaiah 52:5).25 But in more literally translated books we 
do find the harsh notion that God or His words are rejected.26 Thus the meaning 
of some verbs, retained in profane contexts, can be weakened in theologically 
sensitive sentences.
The example taken from Proverbs 6:26 touches morality. Refraining here from 
an extensive discussion (see Van der Louw 2007, 323–328), we will concentrate 
on the salient issue. 
~x,l' rK;Ki-d[;( hn"Az hV'ai-d[;b. yKi
dWct' hr'q'y> vp,n< vyai tv,aew>
Timh. ga.r po,rnhj o[sh kai. e`no.j a;rtou(
gunh. de. avndrw/n timi,aj yuca.j avgreu,ei)
For in exchange of a prostitute 
to a round-loaf of bread
and a wife-of-man hunts for a 
precious soul.
For the cost of a prostitute is as little as 
that of just one [loaf of] bread
but for costly souls hunts a woman  
of men.
In the context of a warning against adultery, this verse says that visiting a 
prostitute costs only a piece of bread, but adultery with a married woman is very 
dangerous, because her husband will take revenge. Now in the second stich the 
expression Xya tXa ‘married woman’ (lit. ‘woman of a man’) has not been rendered 
in an idiomatic way. Perhaps the phrase, which appears further in Leviticus 20:10 
and became a fixed term in Jewish law, was unknown to the translator? I consider 
this unlikely. A second possibility is that the translator avoided gunh. gameth, ‘married 
woman’ because in this context Xya tXa ‘married woman’ does not mean every 
married woman, but only the adulterous one, a problem felt by modern versions.27 
But he could have written ¿gunh.À moicali,j without any problem, as in 18:22; 24:55. I 
would rather suggest that the translator consciously reinterpreted the second stich, 
because the verse as a whole is permissive towards prostitution, a fact not missed 
by modern commentators. The stich seems to mean ‘if you visit a prostitute, it will 
do you little damage apart from the loss of one loaf of bread, but...’ It is not difficult 
to see why a Jewish translator would find this message disturbing.28 He therefore 
25 A similar picture emerges in the renderings of the synonymous verb sa;m' ‘to spurn’. In the LXX-
Pentateuch, God or His words are not ‘spurned’, but ‘disobeyed’, ‘disregarded’ etc. LXX-Isaiah follows 
this pattern: God and His words are the object of ouvk evqe,lw ‘to desire not’ (5:24) and avpeiqe,w ‘to 
disobey’ (30:12).
26 We find e.g. avpwqe,w ‘to push away’ in Jeremiah 6:19; avpodokima,zw ‘to reject’ in Jeremiah 8:9; 
evxouqene,w ‘to set at naught’ in 1 Kingdoms (MT 1 Samuel) 8:7; 10:19 etc.
27 NIV ‘… and the adulteress preys upon your very life.’ Similarly TOB and TEV.
28 Philo, e.g., denounces prostitutes and their customers in the most damning terms and claims on 
the basis of Deuteronomy 23:18 that Jewish law demands death penalty for prostitutes; De Iosepho 
43, cf. De specialibus legibus III 51. Further De spec. leg. I 102, 104, 280. A lenient attitude towards 
prostitution was also found in the Roman world. Horace, Sermones I, 2, 34 quotes a saying by Cato, 
praising a young man who satisfied his libido in a brothel instead of ruining the good name of a 
married woman.
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did not translate the phrase Xya tXa as a whole, but rendered its two members 
separately gunh. avndrw/n ‘woman of [many] men’, thereby turning ‘man’ into plural.
Concluding Remarks
Of course we could give further examples and include (the rarer) instances where 
the translator has added sections of his own, rewritten or cut passages, but this 
would fall outside the scope of the present article. I hope to have demonstrated that 
the study of the translational problems behind transformations is a step towards 
terminological and methodological refinement. 
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